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SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENTS 
Appellants argue in Point I of their Reply Brief that in 
fact and substance U.C.A. 25-1-4 was raised at the trial court 
level. The lower court memorandum makes reference to the fact that 
actual fraudulent intent need not be shown and includes with it 
two Utah Supreme Court cases that analyze U.C.A. 25-1-4. 
Point II argues in three subsections that there is 
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abundant evidence of a fraudulent intent including the Cavanaugh's 
own testimony, the written opinion of Judge Rokich, and the action 
of the bankruptcy trustee in voiding the trust himself. 
Point III argues that the issues of "insolvency" and 
"inability to pay debts as they become due," are dependant on the 
outcome of the then existing Cavanaugh vs. Walker litigation. The 
filing of bankruptcy after judgment was rendered evidences both 
insolvency and an inability to pay debts by Cavanaugh. 
Point IV argues against the position taken by appellee that 
the Geary case applies to this case. Appellant contends that Leach 
v. Anderson opens the way to apply U.C.A. 25-1-11 to real property 
as well as personal property. 
REPLY ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. APPELLEE ERRORS IN ASSERTING THAT WALKER IS RAISING 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 25-1-4 OF THE PRE-1988 FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE STATUTE. 
The issue of fraudulent conveyance as stated in U. C A. 25-
1-4 was raised to the trial court below. The "Memorandum 
Regarding,Supplemental Proceedings On Transfer Of Property Pending 
Litigation," (R-392-402), filed by appellant with the trial court 
on or about December 7, 1987, makes a specific point of arguing 
that actual fraudulent intent to avoid creditors need not be 
proven. This supplemental proceeding memorandum raises two Utah 
Supreme Court cases that discuss U.C.A. 25-1-4, (1) First Security 
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Bank of Utah vs. Vrontikas Brothers, Inc.P 409 P.2nd 1301 (1971) 
and (2) Dahnken vs. Wilmarth, 726 p.2nd 4 20. Courtesy copies of 
these two case were hand delivered to Judge Rokich with the 
supplemental memorandum. (R-398). The Dahnken case has at it's 
core the U.C.A. 25-1-4 statute. The Vrontikas case makes reference 
to this same U.C.A. 25-1-4 statute. Portions of page 8 and 9 of 
the supplemental proceedings memorandum (R-397-398) are reproduced 
here verbatim for easy reference and added argument: 
" By analogy, the Utah Supreme Court case of First Security 
Bank of Utah vs. Vrontikas Brothers. Inc. . 409 P2nd 1301 (1971) is 
also directly applicable to this case. In the First Security Bank 
case, property was transferred without consideration and would 
have had the effect of denying creditors the right to recover 
lawful claims. The District Court set aside the transfer and the 
Supreme Court affirmed. 
In the present case, Cavanaughs both testified that no 
consideration was given for the transfer of the trust property 
into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust. The Supreme Court has made it 
clear in regards to these cases that a transfer of assets to avoid 
creditors without consideration is invalid as to legitimate 
judgments and creditor's claims. 
It is also cle^ ar by case law that actual fraudulent intent to 
avoid creditors need not be proven. It is sufficient to show that 
the trust was created without consideration for the use and 
benefit of the person creating the trust, and to the detriment of 
creditors. See First Security Bank at 490 P2nd page 1302, Dahnken 
vs. Wilmarth 726 P2nd 420, and Leach vs. Anderson." 
The above quote with its reference to two Utah Supreme Court cases 
that deal with U. C. A. 25-1-4 and the reference to the fact that 
no actual fraudulent intent need be proven raised before Judge 
Rokich the substance of the conveyance argument of 25-1-4. 
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Appellant points out that the issue on appeal was raised at 
a supplemental hearing that took place six months after the jury 
trial was concluded in Walker's favor. This issue could not be 
raised at trial but came only to light after the trial. Appellant 
is not seeking to raise a new issue on appeal, but merely 
elaborates the issues presented below at a post trial motion. 
It is true that the greater focus at the trial court supplemental 
hearing was on U.C.A. 25-1-11, but it is inaccurate to say that 
U.C.A. 25-1-4 was never raised at all. The case law submitted to 
Judge Rokich raises U.C.A. 25-1-4 and it is in fact argued, 
however briefly. 
Furthermore, the entire substance of the post trial motion 
was the issue of fraudulent conveyance to a trust to avoid 
creditors. All arguments before this Court that go to the issue of 
fraudulent conveyance were in substance argued below and should be 
considered now. 
POINT II. THERE IS OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF A FRAUDULENT INTENT 
BY THE CAVANAUGHS TO TRANSFER ASSETS TO DEFRAUD THIS CREDITOR. 
A. THE CAVANAUGH'S OWN TESTIMONY IN THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE 
SUPPLEMENTAL HEARING SUPPORTS A FINDING OF FRAUDULENT INTENT. 
The appellee argues on page eight of their brief that, " The 
Facts Do Not Support an Inference Of Fraudulent Intent." Appellant 
contends that this argument is totally without merit. Dahnken, 
Inc. Of Salt Lake City, v. Wilmarth, 726 P. 2nd 420 at 423, sets 
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forth the "badges of fraud," that are to be used to infer 
fraudulent intent. Those badges of fraud are previously cited on 
page 15 of Appellant's Brief and discussed in detail. Simply 
restated here, they are; (1) continuing in possession, (2) 
anticipating litigation, and (3) conveying to a family member 
without consideration. 
Appellant asks this Court to once again look at these three 
badges of fraud through the Cavanaughs own testimony. Since the 
filing of the Appellant's brief, the appellee by motion with a 
subsequent Order has had the transcript of the hearing before 
Judge Rokich made a part of the record. Appellant will refer 
directly to the testimony from that transcript to show that all 
the above stated Dahnken badges of fraud are cleiarly present. 
First, on continuing in possession and evidencing the 
perquisites of ownership, Mr. Cavanaugh read into the record the 
controlling Trust language, as follows; 
"As long as the undersigned is alive, the grantor 
reserves the right to amend, modify or revoke this trust 
concerning the property and the trust to the property in 
whole or in part, including the principal and present or 
past undistributed income from such principal." 
Immediately thereafter, Mr Cavanaugh was asked; 
Q. "Isn't it true that Violet P. Cavanaugh has the right to 
amend, modify, revoke the trust in whole or in part for as long as 
she's alive? 
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A. "That's true." 
(Hearing transcript page 9 line 17 to page 10 line 8) 
Mr. Cavanaugh was then asked;. 
Q. "And if there are benefits that are received through the 
trust, who is the beneficiary of those proceeds, of those 
benefits?" 
A. "It would be Violet P. Cavanaugh, I assume. It's her 
trust." 
(Hearing transcript page 12 line 12 to line 16) 
Q. "But is it your understanding that Violet P. Cavanaugh can 
then use those trust fund benefits in any way she wants?" 
A. "She can." 
(Hearing transcript page 13 line 5 to line 8) 
Mrs. Cavanaugh was then examined with respect to the trust 
benefits. Her testimony is found on page 17 line 22 through page 
18 line 19 of the hearing transcript as follows; 
Q. " Mrs. Cavanaugh, are you familiar with the Violet P. 
Cavanaugh trust that is the subject of this hearing?" 
A. " Yes, I am." 
Q. " And are you the trustee in that trust?" 
A. "Now, what we have— Yes, I guess so." 
Q. "Mrs. Cavanaugh, is it your understanding that you have 
full power to — 
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A. "Yes." 
Q. —revoke the trust." 
A. "Yes. I have full power of the trust." 
Q. "And that you have full power over the use of the 
proceeds— 
A. "Yes." 
Q. —of the trust." 
A. "Yes, I understand that." 
Q. "And that all of the benefits received by the trust come 
to you to be disbursed or used as you see fit?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "And you have that power as long as you7re alive; is that 
correct?" 
A. "Yes, I understand that." 
It is evident from this questioning that Mrs. Cavanaugh, who 
is also the judgment debtor of Mr. Walker, retained full power, 
control, rights and benefits of the trust property, and but for 
her bankruptcy would have continued to do so for as long as she 
lived. There is no greater prerequisite of property ownership than 
full and complete power of control. The first badge of fraud is 
fully satisfied. 
Secondly, on the issue of making a conveyance in anticipation 
of litigation, consider again the testimony of Mr. Cavanaugh; 
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Q. " With regard to the three pieces of property that you 
have just mentioned and the promissory note, when were those 
assets transferred into the trust?" 
A. Date of the trust is March 20th, 1986." 
Q. And that is after the commencement of the legal action 
that is—that we have been to trial on; is that correct?" 
A. "I believe it is." 
(Hearing transcript page 4 line 25 to page 5 line 7) 
Legal action by Mr. Cavanaugh had commenced, a promissory 
note owing to Mr. Walker by Mr. Cavanaugh in a sum exceeding 
$420,000 was long past due, counterclaims were imminent. The 
argument of appellee that the transfer of property to trust was 
not in anticipation of litigation is unfounded and unpersuasive. 
The third badge of fraud from Dahnken contemplates no 
consideration with the transfer going to a family member. There 
can be no dispute that Mrs. Cavanaugh is the wife of Mr. 
Cavanaugh, thus satisfying the family member point. Now consider 
this testimony of Mr. Cavanaugh at the hearing; 
Q. "When you transferred the property into the Violet P. 
Cavanaugh trust, did you receive any consideration other than the 
tax benefits that you briefly alluded to?" 




Q. "Did your wife?" 
A. "No." 
(Hearing transcript page 11 line 1 through line 9) 
Even the tax benefits, if any, go to Mrs. Cavanaugh as she 
receives all benefits from and has all control over the trust. 
There was, without dispute, no consideration given for the 
transfer of the trust property. Judge Rokich specifically stated 
so in his written decision on page 2 pagaraph 1. (R-398). Thus 
all of the badges of fraud are present by virtue of the 
Cavanaugh's own testimony. 
Appellee argues that because Cavanaughs have stated that in 
their subjective intent they did not intend to defraud by their 
conveyance, that there was no fraud. Appellee expects Mr. Walker 
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the subjective 
intent of Mr. and Mrs. Cavanaugh was to so defraud. This is an 
impossible burden etbsent a confession by the Cavanaughs themselves 
and is not the requirement of the law. Wctlker has done all that 
the law requires by showing that all the badges of fraud are 
present. This burden has been confirmed by Judge Rokich. 
B. THE MEMORANDUM DECISION OF JUDGE ROCKICH SPECIFICALLY STATES 
THAT THE VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST WAS CREATED TO THE DETRIMENT 
OF HER CREDITORS. 
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The memorandum decision of Judge Rokich strongly indicates 
that a fraudulent intent was present. On that basis he invalidated 
the trust as to all personal property. In the memorandum decision, 
Judge Rokich spells out in clear and convincing language through 
nine separate points that all of the badges of fraud are present 
in this case. Judge Rokich then states, "There is no question that 
the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust was created for her own use and 
benefit and to the detriment of her creditors." (Emphasis added, 
R-390, and page 3 of the memorandum decision of Judge Rokich, 
addendum A to appellant's brief.) The Substituted Plaintiff and 
Respondent, with all respect, were not present through this case 
and have not seen the obvious indicia of fraudulent intent that 
pervades. Judge Rokich has left the record clear by specifically 
stating that the trust was created "to the detriment of 
creditors." 
The problem with the decision of Judge Rokich, and the 
reason for the appeal, is that he decided the issue of real 
property separately and on the unwarranted precedent of Geary v. 
Cain. Judge Rokich stated in his written opinion; "If it were not 
for the Geary case the court would be inclined to invalidate the 
trust as to the real property also." (R-391, and Addendum A to 
appellant's brief, last sentence). The only reason Judge Rokich 
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did not invalidate the trust as to all property was the language 
of the Geary case. 
C. THE SUBSTITUTED PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT, AS BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE, 
VOIDED THE CAVANAUGH TRUST IN ORDER TO REACH THE ASSETS. 
The substituted plaintiff, or appellee, argues that the 
Violet P. Cavanaugh trust is valid as against Walker's jury 
awarded judgment be^ cause there is no actual fraudulent intent. At 
the same time, the substituted plaintiff, on the theory of 
invalidating fraudulent trusts to protect creditors, has 
invalidated the Violet P. Cavanaugh trust in his capacity as 
Bankruptcy Trustee. Appellee invalidated the trust to reach the 
very assets that he now seeks to prevent Walker from obtaining. 
The Bankruptcy Trustee uses the law of fraudulent conveyance to 
grasp the Cavanaugh assets and then argues that Walker does not 
have the law of fraudulent conveyance to recover the same assets. 
Stated another way, the Violet P. Cavanaugh trust could not have 
been a valid trust or else the Bankruptcy trustee could not have 
invalidated it in the first place and made it's assets a part of 
the bankruptcy estate. 
There must have been clear and convincing evidence of a 
fraudulent conveyance because the Violet P. Cavanaugh trust was 
invalidated by the substituted plaintiff when the Cavanaughs filed 
bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy trustee is, in his cippellee's brief, 
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arguing against the very basis that allowed him to reach the 
Cavanaugh's assets to begin with. This element of double standard 
being employed by the substituted plaintiff and respondent is 
without logic or equity. 
POINT III. ON THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, CAVANAUGHS BECOMING 
INSOLVENT AND BEING ABOUT TO INCUR DEBTS BEYOND THEIR ABILITY TO 
PAY WERE BOTH ENCOMPASSED WITHIN THE FACT THAT LITIGATION WAS 
PENDING AND A LARGE JUDGMENT IN WALKER'S FAVOR WAS IMMINENT. 
Appellee argues in Point I B. on page 6 of their brief that 
the record does not reflect that Violet Cavanaugh was insolvent at 
the time of the creation the trust. Along the same theory, 
Appellee argues in Point IV on page 11 of their brief that the 
Cavanaughs did not believe that they were about to incur debts 
beyond their ability to pay them. These legal theories are founded 
on the statutory language of now repealed U.C.A. 25-1-4 and 25-1-6 
respectively. However, under the facts of the present case, these 
two points raise the same basic argument that is contemplated in 
the common law theory of conveyance of property in anticipation of 
litigation, as set forth in the Dahnken case. That is, whether 
Cavanaughs are insolvent at the time of the creation of the trust, 
or whether Cavanaughs are about to incur debts beyond their 
ability to pay, depends on the net result of the pending 
litigation between Cavanaughs and Walker. But look to the bottom 
line. Cavanaughs filed bankruptcy as soon as Walker got his 
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judgment and begcin to collect on it against the personal 
property. Filing bankruptcy assumes both insolvency and the 
inability to pay debts as they become due. 
On the other hand, the appellee argues to this Court that 
because Cavanaughs did not "believe" that they were insolvent at 
the exact time the trust was created, and because at the moment 
the trust was created they did not have debts beyond their ability 
to pay, the statutory language of 25-1-4 and 25-1-6 do not apply 
and the conveyance is valid. The law can not and should not be 
viewed so narrowly and applied so restrictively. From both the 
viewpoint of law and equity it is sufficient to show that 
litigation was unde>rway, the judgment debtor was unable to pay his 
creditor and bankruptcy was thereafter filed. Accordingly, both 
Point I B. and Point IV of appellee7s brief are not persuasive and 
should be dismissed. 
POINT IV. THE GEARY V. CAIN CASE, OF 1932, IS NOT THE CONTROLLING 
LAW OF THESE FACTS AND WAS NOT CORRECTLY APPLIED TO THIS CASE. 
Appellant argues that Geary v. Cain should not be applied to 
the facts of this case. Appellee argues that Geary is right on 
point. Resolution therefore requires the court to review the Geary 
case in light of the facts presented. Appellant reiterates that 
Geary is distinguished because the conveyances were made outright, 
to a separate legal entity, the Doris Trust Co., and far in 
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advance of any litigation. The facts established that the debtor 
did not own the real estate so transferred, but owned just one 
share of stock of the Doris Trust Company Furthermore, there was 
no written trust agreement between the parties and the court 
therefore dismissed any theory of transfer in trust. The court 
concluded that because the conveyance was valid and there was no 
written trust agreement, the real property in question could not 
be executed upon. The substance of the decision had nothing to do 
with the fraudulent conveyance statute. To apply the Geary case to 
the facts of this case is simply wrong. 
It is Leach vs. Anderson. 535 P2nd 1241 (Utah 1975) that 
raises the inference that U.C.A. 25-1-11 applies to real estate as 
well as personal property. Justice Crockett notes, "The statute is 
but a codification of the common law, which for reasons discussed 
herein, refused to give recognition to trusts of this character 
involving any kind of property." (Emphasis added, 535 P.2nd at 
1244.) If indeed the statute is but a codification of the common 
law, as stated by Justice Crockett in Leach, then it makes no 
sense to strictly construe the statute against the common law 
thereby preventing Mr. Walker from collecting his judgment. 
The footnote to the above quote reinforces this more rational 
construction by stating that a trust for the benefit of the 
grantor is uniformly held entirely invalid. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellee seeks through a maze of technicalities and 
restrictive interpretations to thwart the obvious justice of 
allowing Mr. Walker to collect his jury awarded judgment. 
The simple facts and substance of the law require that this lawful 
judgment creditor be paid. It is respectfully requested that the 
lower court's order only partially invalidating the trust be 
reversed and an order entered allowing Mr. Walker's judgment to 
attach as a judgment lien as of the date judgment w^s entered. 
Dated this 21st day of Octobe/^Z99^ 
£ ' 
Richard K. Nebeker 
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